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ARTICLE 13(1)(A) OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS 
Arnold N. Pronto* 
ABSTRACT 
Although the movement to “codify” the rules and principles of 
international law predates the Charter of the United Nations, it was with the 
adoption of Article 13(1)(a) thereof, and subsequent establishment of the 
International Law Commission, that the codification movement came into its 
own. While the notion of “codification” was well-understood by 1945, it was 
nonetheless included in the Charter in a novel way, in a dichotomy with the 
concept of “progressive development.” This paper seeks to provide a 
comprehensive legislative history of Article 13(1)(a), drawing from the 
travaux préparatoires of the San Francisco Conference. It focuses, in 
particular, on the origins of the introduction of the concept of “progressive 
development” and the connection with the problem of revision. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The impulse to systematize the rules and principles of international law 
in a “code” predates the Charter of the United Nations. Depending on one’s 
understanding of the concept of “codification,” such efforts stretch back 
hundreds of years, if not longer. In its modern guise, one may trace its history 
to the ideas of Jeremy Bentham, and others.1 It is a common feature of 
modern international relations that states not only resort to treaties by way of 
guaranteeing their accommodations reached inter se, but also to lay down, in 
an expository manner, the rules of international law more generally. Modern 
treaty collections contain numerous examples of such treaties (or treaties with 
some provisions purporting to codify the law more generally). The 
codification of international law has become part and parcel of the modern 
liberal project which has sought to regulate the relations between nation 
states through a rule-based system.  
It is not too far-fetched to argue that interest in such activities has 
historically peaked in the aftermath of major conflict. The resort to law, as 
opposed to war, in settling international disputes has a long pedigree, again 
primarily as a manifestation of the liberal worldview. The peace agreement 
negotiated at the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, included several embryonic 
efforts at codifying the rules of international law generally, in relation to 
international rivers, the abolition of slave trade, and the recognition of 
diplomatic envoys. So, too, the political settlement established after the First 
World War in the Versailles Treaty2 was anchored in a newly established 
international legal architecture. The modern codification movement was 
propelled forward by concerted action undertaken in the wake of both world 
wars. 
This is not to deny the existence of major codification efforts during 
peacetime. Numerous major international conferences have been held, and 
treaties concluded, during peacetime, including in the years immediately 
prior to the First World War.3 Rather, the assertion being made is that the 
international settlement following major conflicts (initially in Europe, but in 
more recent times, throughout the world) provided the framework for 
subsequent efforts at codifying rules of international law at the global level. 
 
1 For an overview of early codification proposals and efforts, see UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT, 
THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1–3, U.N. Sales No. E.17.V.2 (9th ed. 2017). 
2 Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 1919 U.S.T. 42. 
3 Perhaps the most well-known examples are the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences, which 
reached agreement on several conventions relating generally to the laws of war and to the pacific 
settlement of disputes. See THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, TRANSLATION OF 
THE ORIGINAL TEXTS VOLUMES I–IV: THE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907 (W.S. Hein 2000); see also 
Historical Survey of the Development of International Law and its Codification by International 
Conferences, U.N. Doc. A/AC.10/5, reprinted in 41 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 29 (1947). 
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In the early years, such efforts were primarily motivated by the hope that the 
imposition of rules would help ameliorate the conditions that might lead to a 
reversion to war. In more recent times, such basic concerns have been 
supplemented by the impulse, inter alia, to improve the plight of human 
beings and the environment. 
The United Nations’ predecessor, the League of Nations, although not 
expressly entrusted with the task of codifying international law, nonetheless 
undertook several initiatives aimed at doing precisely that (at least in relation 
to certain aspects). In 1927, the League of Nations convened a diplomatic 
conference to codify several topics of international law, identified by a 
Committee of Experts as being sufficiently “ripe” for international 
agreement. The conference was held at The Hague, from 13 March to 12 
April 1930, and resulted in the negotiation of four instruments concerning 
nationality.4 Although of limited success,5 the Hague Codification 
Conference was the first global (as it then was) attempt at codifying entire 
fields of international law more generally, rather than addressing specific 
legal problems. However, it was with the adoption of the Charter of the 
United Nations, in 1945, that the codification movement came into its own. 
Article 13(1)(a) of the Charter empowers the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, inter alia, to: 
initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose 
of encouraging the progressive development of international 
law and its codification.  
This provision has served as an important basis for contemporary work 
on the codification of international law. In particular, it has provided the 
mandate for the work of the International Law Commission (ILC), the 
primary subsidiary body of the General Assembly entrusted with the task of 
fulfilling the mandate in Article 13. The ILC has carried out this mandate 
continuously over the last seventy years, resulting in the development of a 
significant body of rules and principles of international law. 
Despite being relatively well-established in 1945, the concept of 
“codification” was reflected in the Charter of the United Nations in a novel 
way, as one part of a dichotomy with the element of “progressive 
development.” This did two things. First, it introduced a new concept 
 
4 The Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Apr. 12, 
1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89–113; Protocol Relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double 
Nationality, Apr. 12, 1930, 178 L.N.T.S. 227–38; Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness, 
Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 115–26; Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness, League of Nations Doc. 
C.27.M.16.1931.V (1930). 
5 The Conference was unable to agree on any conventions concerning the other two topics before 
it (territorial water and state responsibility). 
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(“progressive development”) into the lexicon of international law-making. 
Secondly, it led to a subtle shift in the received understanding of the meaning 
of “codification,” which since then has been construed in contra-distinction 
to “progressive development.”  
This paper considers the first proposition, and seeks to provide a 
comprehensive legislative history of Article 13(1)(a), focusing on the travaux 
préparatoires of the San Francisco Conference.6 In doing so, it will explore 
the origins of the introduction of the “progressive development” element and 
demonstrate, in particular, its connection with the problem of the revision of 
treaties (and that of international law more generally).  
II. THE DRAFTING HISTORY OF ARTICLE 13(1)(A) 
Two preliminary reflections are worth noting at the outset. First, while 
many provisions of the Charter barely feature in the official records of the 
San Francisco Conference, or do so in a rather perfunctory manner (as having 
largely been agreed to before the conference), this is not the case with Article 
13(1)(a), which was discussed, in its various manifestations, on several 
occasions throughout the conference, leaving the reader with a relative 
wealth of material to contemplate and draw inferences from.  
The second, more substantive, initial reflection is the link between what 
came to be adopted as “progressive development of international law” and 
prevailing concerns about the revision of international law. It is not always 
fully appreciated that, as will be demonstrated below, the origins of the 
codification versus progressive development dichotomy are to be found in 
the debate on the revision of international law, as it played out during the 
inter-war period. An analysis of the discussion in San Francisco reveals, inter 
alia, that the drafters had an inherently quasi-revisionary exercise in mind 
when coming to the notion of the “progressive development.” 
A. Dumbarton Oaks Proposals 
The Four Power Declaration7 adopted, in Moscow in 1943, by the 
United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the (then) Republic 
of China, called for the establishment of a new international organization to 
succeed the League of Nations. The process of establishing such organization 
was set into motion at a conference held from August to October 1944 in 
 
6 See U.N. Conference on International Organization, Documents of the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization, U.N. Doc. G/8/11 (Vols. I–XXI) (May 28, 1945) [hereinafter 
Documents]. 
7 Moscow Conference of Foreign Secretaries, Declaration of the Four Nations on General 
Security (Oct. 30, 1943). 
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Dumbarton Oaks (Washington, D.C.), attended by the same four powers. 
Owing to the fact that the Soviet Union did not recognize the representatives 
from China, the conference proceeded in two phases, with the first involving 
negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United 
Kingdom, which resulted in the “Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General 
International Organization” (hereinafter the “Dumbarton Oaks Proposals”).8 
In the second phase, the United States and the United Kingdom held 
discussions with the representatives of China, during which the latter 
representatives made a series of proposals. All four governments agreed to 
submit the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, together with three Chinese 
proposals to the United Nations Conference on International Organization, 
convened in San Francisco, in 1945. 
The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals contained minimal reference to 
“international law.” Provision was made for the establishment of an 
international court of justice,9 to which “justiciable disputes” were to be 
referred, and from which the envisaged Security Council could seek advice 
on “legal questions”10; and for the exclusion of disputes arising out of matters 
which, under international law, were solely within the domestic jurisdiction 
of the state concerned.11 However, of the three proposals put forward by the 
Chinese Government, two dealt specifically with international law, of which 
the second read: 
 [t]he [General] Assembly should be responsible for 
initiating studies and making recommendations with respect 
to the development and revision of the rules and principles 
of international law.12 
B. San Francisco Conference 
The San Francisco Conference was held from 25 April to 26 June 1945 
and was open to the 50 allied nations (known collectively as “the United 
Nations”), including the four sponsoring powers. The Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals (including the Chinese proposals) served as the basis for the 
 
8 See generally U.N. Conference on International Organization, Dumbarton Oaks Proposals 
Comments and Proposed Amendments, in 3 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization (1945) [hereinafter Documents Vol. III]. 
9 Id. at 11–12. 
10 Id. at 14. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 25. The other proposal was as follows: “The Charter should provide specifically that 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes should be achieved with due regard for principles of 
justice and international law.” 
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negotiations. The conference proceeded in phases. Most delegations 
submitted written proposals for amendment to the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals in advance of the conference. Upon convening, delegations took 
the opportunity of the plenary debate, held over eight sessions from 26 April 
to 2 May 1945, to elaborate on their written proposals, and to make further 
proposals. 
The draft text of the Charter was divided into four sections, each of 
which was to be studied by a Commission.13 The provision of the Charter, 
which subsequently became Article 13, was considered by Commission II 
(Functions of the General Assembly), chaired by the then Prime Minister of 
South Africa, General Jan C. Smuts (1870–1950).14 Further debate on the 
various proposals, including those relating to what became Article 13, was 
held in the plenary of Commission II over four meetings (from 30 May to 21 
June 1945). Smuts, in turn, distributed the work among four Committees.15 
Although some discussion was held elsewhere, Article 13 was negotiated in 
the second such Committee (Committee II/2), dealing with the functions and 
powers of the General Assembly.16  
The Plenary of the Conference, at its ninth session, held on 25 June 
1945, adopted the reports of, inter alia, all four Commissions, and then 
proceeded to adopt the Charter of the United Nations as a whole. 
C. Proposals Submitted to the San Francisco Conference 
A number of the proposals submitted in writing to the San Francisco 
Conference made express reference to the role of international law. While the 
focus of the present paper will be on proposals relating to the development 
of international law (the subject matter of Article 13(1)(a)), it is worth 
 
13 The first was responsible for the organization’s purposes, principles, membership, secretariat, 
and the question of amendments to the Charter. The second considered functions of the General Assembly. 
The third dealt with the Security Council. The fourth dealt with the assessment of the draft Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, which had been drafted by a team of legal experts from 44 countries, 
meeting in Washington, D.C., in April 1945. 
14 General Smuts enjoyed the rare distinction of having played a role in the establishment of both 
the League of Nations and the United Nations, and, in addition to presiding over Commission II, was 
largely responsible for the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations. 
15 Committee II/1 (Structure and procedures of the General Assembly), Committee II/2 (Functions 
and powers of the General Assembly), Committee II/3 (ECOSOC), and Committee II/4: Trusteeship 
system. In the initial plan for the Charter, the latter two entities were envisaged as falling within the 
structure of the General Assembly. It was only later on that it was decided to raise both to the level of 
principal organs of the United Nations, alongside the General Assembly. 
16 The Committee held 25 meetings from 4 May to 20 June 1945. It also established 
Subcommittees II/2/A and II/2/B. Some (more general) discussion was also held in the first Committee 
(Committee II/1). 
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remembering that such proposals were put forward in a broader context of 
efforts by many participating Governments to anchor the envisaged Charter 
in international law.17 
A number of the written proposals dealt with the possibility of granting 
the new organization a mandate to develop international law. Hence, Egypt, 
in its comments of 16 April 1945, opined that: 
It would also be advisable that the new Organization should 
endeavour to further and develop International Law either by 
the channel of some special agency depending on the 
General Assembly, or through the existing Economic and 
Social Council. The rules now generally accepted as the Law 
of Nations, which are the outcome of the evolution of 
centuries of international practice, have often helped to 
avoid armed conflicts and to develop peaceful relations 
between different States. The weakness of International Law 
was that, contrary to all other branches of Law, its rules 
could not be enforced. Now, finally, military power is put at 
the disposal of a World Organization which is the latest 
expression of the Law of Nations, and the climax of a long 
process of international thought. It is more than ever 
necessary to determine and define those rules of 
International Law, now that they are being given that 
essential element of authority which hitherto they have 
lacked.18 
It, accordingly, proposed the insertion of, inter alia, the following 
subparagraph into the provision relating to the powers of the General 
Assembly: 
To determine, define, codify and develop the rules of 
international law and international morality.  
 
17 For example, the Brazilian Delegation submitted an amendment to Chapter II (Principles), para. 
2, of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, whereby “[a]ll members of the Organization [would] undertake, in 
order to insure to all of them the right and benefits resulting from membership in the Organization, to 
respect and carry out scrupulously the treaties and agreements to which they are parties and to fulfil the 
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter.” U.N. Conference on International 
Organization, Amendment to Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Submitted by the Brazilian Delegation, U.N. 
Doc. 2 G/7(3)(1) (May 3, 1945), in Documents Vol. III, supra note 8, at 243. 
18 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Suggestions of the Egyptian Government on the 
Tentative Proposals of Dumbarton Oaks under examination at the United Nations Conference at San 
Francisco, U.N. Doc. 2 G/7(q) (Apr. 16, 1945), in Documents Vol. III, supra note 8, at 448.  
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Similar drafting proposals were made by Australia (“for promoting the 
development and revision of the rules and principles of international law”)19 
and Liberia (“[t]he General Assembly shall also initiate studies which should 
lead to the Codification of International Law”).20 For its part, Lebanon 
somewhat presciently proposed the creation of: 
a permanent Committee of Jurists whose function shall be 
the periodic codification or consolidation of existing 
principles of international law together with the 
modifications thereof which shall be deemed necessary from 
time to time.21  
In its view, “[i]t [was] obvious that the precise formulation of the law of 
nations, brought always up-to-date in accordance with the development of 
the theory and practice of that law, [would] be a potent instrument for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.”22  
Iran proposed a similar amendment to Chapter XII (Transitional 
Arrangements) of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, to which the following 
subparagraph would be added:  
A Committee of qualified Jurists should be established to 
draw up a code of International Law.23 
Some delegations went further and proposed endowing the General 
Assembly with the power to legislate international law. Hence, the 
Philippines was of the view that: 
The General Assembly should be vested with the legislative 
authority to enact rules of international law which should 
become effective and binding upon the members of the 
Organization after such rules have been approved by a 
majority vote of the Security Council . . . In the exercise of 
 
19 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals 
Submitted on Behalf of Australia, U.N. Doc. 2 G/14(1) (May 5, 1945), in Documents Vol. III, supra note 
8, at 546. 
20 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Memorandum of the Liberian Government on 
the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, U.N. Doc. 2 G/14(a) (May 2, 1945), in Documents Vol. III, supra note 
8, at 465. 
21 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Lebanon’s Suggestions on the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals Which will be Submitted for Discussion in the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization to be Held in San Francisco on April 25, 1945, U.N. Doc. 2 G/14(c) (May 2, 1945), in 
Documents Vol. III, supra note 8, at 473. 
22 Id. 
23 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Amendments Presented by the Delegation of 
Iran to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, U.N. Doc. 2 G/14(m) (May 5, 1945), in Documents Vol. III, supra 
note 8, at 556. 
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this legislative authority the General Assembly may codify 
the existing rules of international law with such changes as 
the Assembly may deem proper.24 
 
 Likewise, Ecuador envisaged the establishment of a “juridical 
community in which the Assembly and Council can perform the legislative 
and executive functions, respectively . . . ,”25 and hence proposed the 
following amendment to be included among the powers of the General 
Assembly: 
The power to establish or progressively amend the principles 
and rules of law which are to govern the relations between 
the States lies with the General Assembly, through a two-
thirds majority of its members. The instruments embodying 
those principles and rules shall only come into compulsory 
effect for all members of the Organization when they are 
ratified by a number equivalent to a two-thirds part of it.26 
D. Consideration in Committee II/2 
What is clear from the above is that by the time Committee II/2 turned 
its attention to the functions and powers of the General Assembly, it already 
had before it a number of proposals for the expansion of such functions to 
include the development of international law (whether by way of the 
authority to revise existing treaties or more generally). The basis of the 
discussion was paragraph 6 of Chapter V, section B, of the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals, which read: 
The General Assembly should initiate studies and make 
recommendations for the purpose of promoting international 
cooperation in political, economic and social fields and of 
adjusting situations likely to impair the general welfare.27 
 
24 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Proposed Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals Submitted by the Philippine Delegation, U.N. Doc. 2 G/14(k) (May 5, 1945), in Documents 
Vol. III, supra note 8, at 536–37. 
25 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Delegation of Ecuador to the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization, U.N. Doc. 2 G/7(p) (May 1, 1945), in Documents Vol. III, 
supra note 8, at 404. 
26 Id. at 427. 
27 U.N. Conference on International Organization, The United Nations Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals for a General International Organization, U.N. Doc. 1 G/P, in Documents Vol. III, supra note 
8, at 6. 
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An initial step was taken at the third meeting of Committee II/2, held on 
9 May 1945, when the United States, on behalf of the four “sponsoring” 
powers and France, proposed the following amendment to paragraph 6, 
which was adopted without reservations: 
The General Assembly should initiate studies and make 
recommendations for the purpose of promoting international 
cooperation in political, economic, social and cultural fields 
to assist in the realization of human rights and basic 
freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, language, 
religion or sex and also for the encouragement of the 
development of international law.28 
Subsequently, Committee II/2 requested Subcommittee A to review all 
the written proposals and views expressed by delegations, together with the 
amendment adopted on May, and to systematize all the issues raised therein 
into a series of questions to be considered by the Committee.29 The 
Subcommittee subsequently submitted a report containing several questions 
organized under three categories of issues: (1) pertaining to the development 
of the rules and principles of international law more generally; (2) concerning 
the revision of treaties; and (3) relating to the power of the General Assembly 
to formulate general conventions.30 Of the three, the second, concerning the 
power to impose the revision of treaties, proved to be the most contentious. 
1. The Development of International Law: Recommendations 
Versus Legislation 
The first set of questions contrasted two approaches to developing 
international law. On the one hand, the General Assembly of the future 
organization would only have the power to initiate studies with a view to 
making recommendations aimed at the development of the law. The 
alternative approach was to endow the Assembly with legislative authority to 
make and impose law. While the initial proposal by the Chinese delegation, 
and those of several other delegations, had favored the more cautious 
approach, several delegations (including, for example the Philippines, as 
referred to above) had called for a more robust set of powers to be awarded 
to the General Assembly. More than just a philosophical difference of 
 
28 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of the Third Meeting of 
Committee II/2, U.N. Doc. 203 II/2/8 (May 10, 1945), in 9 Documents of the United Nations Conference 
on International Organizations 21–22 (1945) [hereinafter Documents Vol. IX] (emphasis added). 
29 See U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Summary Report of the Eighth Meeting of 
Committee II/2, U.N. Doc. 392 II/2/17 (May 18, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 53.  
30 See U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Second Report of Subcommittee A, U.N. 
Doc. 416 II/2/A/3 (May 18, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 346–48. 
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approach, the two options reflected starkly different visions of the nature, 
role, and powers of the international organization being established. 
Four questions were developed, two for each approach. The questions 
were put to the vote at the tenth meeting of Committee II/2, held on 21 May 
1945. The official record of the meeting (reproduced below in extenso) 
described the outcome as follows: 
The Chairman put question 1 to the vote, as follows: 
Should the Assembly be empowered to initiate studies 
and make recommendations for the codification of 
international law? 
Decision: 27 affirmative votes, 8 negative; Question 
1 affirmed; 
The Chairman put question 2 to the vote, as follows:  
Should the Assembly be empowered to initiate studies 
and make recommendations for promoting the revision 
of the rules and principles of international law? 
Decision: 16 affirmative votes, 7 negative; Question 
2 affirmed; 
The Chairman put question 3 to the vote, as follows: 
Should the Assembly be authorized to enact rules of 
international law which should become binding upon 
members after such rules shall have been approved by 
the Security Council? 
Decision: 1 affirmative vote, 26 negative; Question 
3 negatived; 
The Chairman put question 4 to the vote as follows:  
Should it be provided that upon the failure of the 
Security Council to act on such rules within a period 
specified in the Charter, they should become effective 
and binding, in the same manner as if they had been 
approved by the Security Council? 
Decision: no affirmative vote, 26 negative; Question 
4 negatived.31 
Therefore, by a series of votes the Committee rejected the possibility of 
granting the General Assembly legislative powers, opting instead only for the 
power to make recommendations, based on studies the Assembly had 
 
31 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Summary Report of Tenth Meeting II/A, U.N. 
Doc. 506 II/2/202 (May 23, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 69–70. 
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previously initiated. The first two (affirmative) decisions also established, for 
the first time, the two prongs of the scope ratione materiae of the 
recommendations being envisaged, namely: for the “codification of 
international law” and for what was then referred to as “promoting the 
revision of the rules and principles of international law.” The concept of 
“progressive development” had not yet found its way into the lexicon of the 
conference.32 
2. Revision of Treaties 
The proposal to grant the General Assembly the power to make 
recommendations aimed at the further development of international law, first 
proposed by the Chinese Government, gave rise to some debate both in the 
Plenary and in Commission II. The source of contention was less the basic 
idea, which faced little opposition, and arose more as a consequence of the 
manner in which the debate was framed. From the beginning (including the 
Chinese proposal), many of the proponents of granting the General Assembly 
enhanced powers linked their proposals to the question of the “revision” of 
existing rules of international law, particularly treaties, as a component of the 
broader debate on peaceful change and adjustment of situations giving rise to 
international disputes, which had arisen during the inter-war period.  
Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations had granted the 
Assembly of the League the authority to: 
[F]rom time to time advise the reconsideration by Members 
of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable 
and the consideration of international conditions whose 
continuance might endanger the peace of the world. 
While the League Assembly never exercised such authority, the problem 
of unfair or onerous treaties was the source of much tension at the 
international level during the inter-war period, and in the case of one 
particular treaty, the Versailles Treaty, lay at the origin of the return to war 
(in Europe).  
In referring to the “revision of the rules and principles of international 
law,” the initial Chinese proposal at Dumbarton Oaks had resurrected the 
possibility of such authority also being granted to the General Assembly of 
the soon to be established United Nations. Some delegations, the Chinese 
included, came to the San Francisco Conference with a vivid history of 
grievances arising from the imposition of treaties enshrining hegemonic rule. 
 
32 An early reference was to be found in an Ecuadorean proposal, dated 1 May 1945, which 
referred to the power to “progressively amend the principles and rules of law.” See supra note 25 and 
accompanying text. 
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For many such states, the promise of a new world order in the proposed 
Charter of the United Nations implied the possibility of being released from 
such treaties. They held out the hope that the General Assembly, like the 
League Assembly before it, would be empowered to make peaceful 
adjustments to the situations giving rise to conflict, including such situations 
arising from the imposition of unfair treaties.  
For example, Egypt maintained that: 
with a view of harmonizing international relationships, we 
suggest it as a duty of the Conference to prescribe principles 
for the revision of treaties which have become inconsistent 
with the new concept or world conditions and collective 
security and might therefore become irritants and a possible 
source of conflict.33 
In the context of the work in Committee II/2, Egypt proposed a drafting 
amendment to add, inter alia, the following to the powers of the General 
Assembly: 
to advise on the request of any member concerned the 
reconsideration of treaties which have become inapplicable 
and the consideration of international conditions whose 
continuance might endanger the peace…34 
Similarly, Lebanon expressed the view that: 
[i]t is obvious that the precise formulation of the law of 
nations, brought always up to date in accordance with the 
development of the theory and practice of that law, will be a 
potent instrument for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.35 
Haiti pointed out that: 
[i]t does not seem superfluous to us to add here that 
international law cannot remain static, no more than civil or 
penal law. It must be capable of adapting itself to the 
changing conditions of life of the peoples of the world.36 
 
33 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Verbatim Minutes of the Third Plenary Session, 
U.N. Doc. 22 P/7 (Apr. 29, 1945), in 1 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International 
Organizations 236 (1945) [hereinafter Documents Vol. I]. 
34 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Report by the Officers on Grouping of 
Suggested Modifications to Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, U.N. Doc. 326 II/2/7(2), annex 2 (May 12, 1945), 
in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 315. 
35 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Verbatim Minutes of the Third Plenary 
Session, U.N. Doc. 22 P/7 (Apr. 29, 1945), in Documents Vol. I, supra note 33, at 251 (emphasis added). 
36 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Verbatim Minutes of the Sixth Plenary 
Session, U.N. Doc. 55 P/13 (May 2, 1945), in Documents Vol. I, supra note 33, at 443 (emphasis added). 
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Subsequently (during the discussion in Committee II/2), Brazil 
proposed that the Charter provide that: 
[a]t the request of any contracting party to an executory 
treaty, who alleges the total or partial caducity of the same, 
or the injustice of its continuation, the Assembly by a two-
thirds majority shall invite one or the other contracting 
parties to come to agreement with the first for the revision or 
cancellation of such treaty. If any of the contracting parties 
are not in agreement with the said revision or cancellation, 
the other one or more contracting parties shall be authorized 
to resort to the permanent international court of justice, in 
order that the latter by judgment may decide if the treaty in 
question has lost all or part of its compulsory force because 
of the fact that the conditions determining its execution have 
changed or that the treaty itself has become unjustly onerous 
for one or the other of the parties.37 
Belgium, responding to criticism expressed by France (see below), 
observed that: 
the Organization would give up a great part of its 
possibilities for helping the peace if the General Assembly 
were to exclude consideration of any dangerous situation 
which might arise directly or indirectly out of certain 
treaties.38 
Other governments were strongly opposed to granting the General 
Assembly the authority to impose adjustments of situations, including the 
power to recommend the revision of treaties. For them, the possibility of 
imposing the revision of treaties, necessarily against the will of one of more 
parties thereto, was itself a potential source of instability, especially since the 
collective security arrangement which emerged from the Second World War 
was to be anchored in treaties (the most prominent of which being the Charter 
itself). For them, the stability of treaties was of paramount importance. 
Hence, France, drawing the opposite historical lesson from the existence 
of Article 19, recalled that: 
in Article 19 of the Covenant were special provisions 
concerning the revision of treaties by the League. There is 
 
37 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Report by the Officers on Grouping of 
Suggested Modifications to Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, U.N. Doc. 326 II/2/7(2), annex 2 (May 12, 1945), 
in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 313–14. 
38 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Verbatim Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of 
Commission II, U.N. Doc. 1151 II/17 (June 22, 1945), in 8 Documents of the United Nations Conference 
on International Organizations 207 (1945) [hereinafter Documents Vol. VIII]. 
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nothing of that kind in the Charter, and this for a very 
important reason: Article 19 was used by Hitler and the other 
dictators as a basis for their territorial claims, and if the 
Assembly were competent to revise treaties at any time, you 
might have agitation for revision of this or that treaty, and 
there would never be any stability in the treaties. And what 
would happen to our own peace which we are going to draft, 
if at any time afterwards there can be agitation with a view 
to its revision?39 
Later on, during the ensuing debate in Committee II/2, the French 
delegation once again expressed the view that: 
the Conference was trying to change the kind of world where 
might is righ[t], in which we have lived too long, and if we 
begin by including an article on treaty revision in the 
Charter, we shall undermine that attempt. Some treaties give 
immediate benefits and impose later obligations; if those 
later obligations are inconvenient, what government could 
resist the temptation to ask for their revision once it has 
reaped the early benefits? What individual, a party to a 
contract, would allow his parliament to intervene and break 
the contract, and how could a country permit the intervention 
of the Assembly in the case of a treaty? Only force majeure 
or the action of a court could make such a change.40 
Colombia opposed any interpretation that gave the General Assembly 
the power to recommend the revision of treaties and indicated that it should 
be “stated very clearly that, once and for all, here in San Francisco this 
problem of the revision of treaties is dead and buried.”41 
The delegate from the Soviet Union: 
strongly urged the view that inclusion of any provision on 
revision of treaties in the Charter would be unsound. To do 
so would be to contradict the principle of the sovereignty of 
states upon which the Organization was to be established. He 
expressed the deep conviction of his Delegation that the task 
of the Conference was not to shatter the foundations of 
 
39 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Verbatim Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of 
Commission II, U.N. Doc. 1151 II/17 (June 22, 1945), in Documents Vol. VIII, supra note 38, at 202. 
40 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Summary Report of Eighteenth Meeting of 
Committee II/2, U.N. Doc. 771 II/2/41 (June 3, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 140 
(emphasis in original). 
41 U.N. Conference on International Organizations, Verbatim Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of 
Commission II, U.N. Doc. 1151 II/17 (June 22, 1945), in Documents Vol. VIII, supra note 383838, at 210. 
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treaties and sow doubts, but to strengthen respect for treaties. 
It would be particularly dangerous to insert in the Charter a 
provision which would undoubtedly undermine all the 
system of agreements with enemy states already concluded 
and of peace treaties yet to be signed. … A provision on 
treaty revision would obviously be used by the enemy states 
to elude the obligations which will be imposed on them. 
Thus the Conference might shatter the edifice constructed 
with so much effort and blood.42 
The delegate of Czechoslovakia indicated that: 
although his country had faithfully executed its every 
international obligation in the years before 1938, it had 
nevertheless been constantly the object of the aggressive 
designs of its neighbors. He attributed this to the terms of 
Article 19 of the League Covenant, which had provided a 
sort of legal cover for the policies of disruption and non-
fulfillment of such countries as Germany and Hungary. His 
Government was therefore unequivocally opposed to the 
insertion in the Charter, before treaties of peace had even 
been concluded, of a specific reference to treaty revision 
. . . .43 
Peru confirmed that “[h]is Government could not accept the inclusion 
in the Charter of an article on treaty revision.”44 The delegation of Chile: 
reminded the Committee that the primary object of the 
Conference was to seek to guarantee peace and security. To 
this end the Delegation of Chile had voted in favor of giving 
the Assembly power to make recommendations for the 
development and codification of international law; and he 
wished to affirm categorically that if a provision for treaty 
revision were written into the Charter, peace and security 
would be imperiled, for respect for treaties is the unalterable 
basis of peace and security. The intangibility of treaties must 
be respected, because it must not be forgotten that the 
surviving fifth and sixth columns of Fascism would seize on 
any pretext for revision, as would the makers of armaments 
on anything which would renew international instability. He 
 
42 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of Eighteenth Meeting of 
Committee II/2, U.N. Doc. 771 II/2/41 (June 3, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 138–39. 
43 Id. at 139. 
44 Id. at 140. 
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considered that frontier treaties, which have been frequently 
mentioned in this debate, become historical facts once they 
are fulfilled . . . .45 
The issue was considered in Committee II/2, over three meetings held 
from 1 to 4 June 1945, on the basis of three questions formulated by 
Subcommittee A. The questions read as follows: 
B. Revision of treaties 
1. Should the Assembly be empowered to examine treaties 
which appear to be inapplicable and to make 
recommendations to the governments (parties thereto) and to 
the Security Council with respect to such treaties? 
2. Should the Assembly, at the request of any member 
concerned be empowered to recommend the reconsideration 
of treaties which become inapplicable? 
3. Should the Assembly, at the request of any party to an 
executory treaty claiming its inapplicability or the injustice 
of its continuation, be empowered to invite the contracting 
parties to agree to the revision or cancellation of the treaty?46 
Upon turning to the discussion of the substance of the three questions, 
the delegate of the United States took the floor to explain that 
although he had originally contemplated a specific allusion 
in the Charter to the question of revision of treaties, he had 
foregone this in favor of the broad version of paragraph 6 of 
Section B, Chapter V, put forward by the four sponsoring 
governments and France [on 9 May 1945]. It was 
inconsistent to launch an international Organization based 
on international integrity and at the same time to intimate 
any lack of respect for the instruments through which 
international integrity functions, namely, treaties. He 
recognized the objections to identifying treaties as such with 
this paragraph and held that the concern of the Assembly was 
not with treaties per se, but with adjusting conditions which 
might impair peace and good relations between nations. 
Considerations of the general welfare may call for a 
recommendation that a treaty be respected rather than 
revised. He submitted that it was wiser not to connect the 
broad version of paragraph 6 with any specific definition 
 
45 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of the Nineteenth Meeting of 
Committee II/2, U.N. Doc. 790 II/2/42 (June 5, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 42, at 149. 
46 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Second Report of Subcommittee A, 3, U.N. Doc. 
416 II/2/A/3 (May 18, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 30, at 347. 
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regarding treaty revision. The phrase “the peaceful 
adjustment of any situations, regardless of origin,” in his 
view, should not be interpreted to mean that the subject of 
treaty revision was foreclosed to the Assembly. If treaties 
gave rise to situations which the Assembly deemed likely to 
impair the general welfare or friendly relations among 
nations, it could make recommendations in respect of these 
situations.47 
The debate on the matter continued for several meetings. In the end, the 
Committee voted not to consider the three questions proposed by the 
Subcommittee, in lieu of the interpretation of paragraph 6 offered by the 
United States, which was accepted by the Committee, including the 
proponents of an express reference to the revision of treaties.48 The power of 
the General Assembly to recommend “measures for the peaceful adjustment 
of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the 
general welfare or friendly relations among nations . . . ,” including 
situations arising from treaties (under the interpretation offered by the United 
States), was subsequently incorporated in Article 14 of the Charter. While 
the idea of including an express reference to the revision of treaties was laid 
to rest, as will be described shortly, the concept of “revision” continued to 
find favour among some delegations in the broader context of the general 
rules and principles of international law. 
3. The Power to Formulate General Conventions 
The third strand of issues identified by Subcommittee A related to 
proposals that the General Assembly be empowered to formulate general 
conventions for adoption by states. The Subcommittee prepared two 
questions. The first question read: 
Should the General Assembly be empowered to submit 
general conventions for the consideration of states which 
form part of the United Nations Organization and, should the 
 
47 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of 
Committee II/2, 2–3, U.N. Doc. 748 II/2/39 (June 2, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 127–
28. 
48 See the views of Belgium, id. at 128 (“while he would have liked that treaties should be 
specifically mentioned, he expressed his support of the interpretation of paragraph 6 given by the Delegate 
of the United States . . . .”), and Egypt, id. at 128–29 (“the three questions formulated for discussion by 
the Committee should be withdrawn because they were amply covered by the interpretation of paragraph 
6 given by the delegate of the United States.”), and Mexico, id. at 130 (“seconded the motion of the 
Delegate of Egypt, on condition that the remarks of the Delegate of the United States should go on record 
as requested.”). 
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occasion arise, for the consideration of other states, with a 
view to securing their approval in accordance with their 
appropriate constitutional procedures?49 
The question had arisen following an amendment proposed by Belgium, 
which explained that while the substance of the proposal was, in part, covered 
by the text of paragraph 6 (of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals), as 
subsequently amended, on 9 May 1945, on the basis of the proposal by the 
four powers and France, the element in the last phrase of the proposal “was 
intended to ensure that states members of the Organization should be required 
to place general conventions recommended and submitted by the Assembly 
before their national parliaments for due consideration.”50 While some 
delegations were of the view that the General Assembly was not the 
appropriate forum for undertaking the drafting of conventions, others 
“wished it to be quite clear that the power of initiating conventions lay with 
the Assembly, although, as a practical method, it could set up special 
committees to do the drafting.”51 The question was put to a roll-call vote, and 
although 25 delegations voted in favor, and 13 against, the Chair ruled that 
the proposed amendment had failed under the two-thirds rule.52  
The second question, which was made up of four parts, concerned the 
possibility of the General Assembly being granted the power to impose 
conventions. All four sub-questions were put to the vote and failed.53 As with 
 
49 Second Report of Subcommittee A, supra note 30, at 347–48. 
50 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting of 
Committee II/2, 2, U.N. Doc. 536 II/2/24 (May 24, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 75. 
51 Id. 
52 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of Twelfth Meeting of 
Committee II/2, 2, U.N. Doc. 571 II/2/27 (May 25, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 80. 
Despite the failure (by one vote) of an express reference being included in the Charter, the power of the 
General Assembly to recommend treaties for the consideration of the member States of the United Nations 
was later anticipated in the Statute of the ILC, adopted in 1947. See G.A. Res. 174 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947), 
amended by G.A. Res. 485 (V) (Dec. 12, 1950) and G.A. Res. 984 (X) (Dec. 3, 1955) and G.A. Res. 985 
(X) (Dec. 3, 1955) and G.A. Res. 36/39 (Nov. 18, 1981). In the intervening period, the Assembly has on 
numerous occasions concluded international conventions, including (but not limited to) when acting under 
Article 13(1)(a) of the Charter. 
53 The four sub-questions were as follows: 
a. Should the General Assembly have the power of imposing conventions when, in its opinion, these 
are mere corollaries of principles it already recognizes as compulsory, or when it believes that that 
general observance of the obligations embodied in the conventions is necessary for the maintenance 
of international peace and security?  
Decision: Affirmative votes 0, negative votes many (not counted). Question negatived.  
b. Should this power also be extended to include other conventions? 
Decision: Affirmative votes 0, negative votes many (not counted). Question negatived.  
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the proposal to grant the General Assembly legislative powers, the possibility 
of it being empowered to impose international law in circumvention of 
national constitutional requirements did not find favor with delegations. 
4. Progressive Development 
Following Committee II/2’s approval, on 9 May 1945, of the proposal 
by the four powers and France that the General Assembly should, in 
principle, be empowered to initiate studies and make recommendations for 
the codification of international law, as well as for promoting the revision of 
the rules and principles of international law, and taking into account the 
subsequent outcome of the Committee’s consideration of the various 
questions prepared by Subcommittee A (discussed above), the task of 
drafting the text of the corresponding provision to be included in the Charter 
was carried out by Subcommittee B. 
In its report, of 5 June 1945, the Subcommittee reported that it had been 
unable to agree on a single formulation, and accordingly had prepared the 
following two alternative formulations for the consideration of Committee 
II/2: 
First . . . and also for the codification of international law, 
the encouragement of its development and the promotion of 
its revision. . . .  
 
Second . . . and also for the encouragement of the 
progressive development of international law and for its 
codification.54 
The Subcommittee had been divided on the point whether it was 
essential, in view of the affirmative vote on a question before Committee II/2 
at its meeting on 21 May 1945, specifically to include the word “revision.” 
Some members had felt that the words “progressive development” 
 
c. As regards member states, should the Assembly have the power to decide that such conventions 
shall come into force under the same conditions that may be provided for the coming into force of 
amendments to the Charter?  
Decision: Affirmative votes 0, negative votes many (not counted). Question negatived. 
d. Should the General Assembly have the power to impose such conventions on non-member states?  
Decision: Affirmative votes 21, negative votes 16. Question negatived [under the two-thirds 
rule]. 
Summary Report of Twelfth Meeting of Committee II/2, supra note 52, at 80–81. 
54 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Third Report of Subcommittee II/2/B, 2, U.N. 
Doc. 793 II/2/B/10 (June 5, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 420 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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adequately covered Committee II/2’s intention. The Subcommittee had 
therefore agreed to send alternative versions to the Committee to choose 
from. The first alternative (“revision”) had been supported by five members, 
and the second alternative (“progressive development”) by three members of 
the Subcommittee.55 
The majority of opinion in the Subcommittee was reversed in 
Committee II/2, when the two alternatives were put to a vote. The first 
alternative attracted only 8 votes, while the second passed with 28 votes.56 
The summary of the views expressed, during the debate in the Committee, in 
favour of each alternative is worth reproducing in extenso as it sheds light on 
the intended meaning of the final text of Article 13 (and demonstrates how 
close the provision came to referring to “revision”): 
In support of the specific mention of revision, as in the first 
alternative draft set out in the report, it was urged that it had 
been suggested to Committee II/2, at its meeting on May 21, 
that “development” necessarily implied “revision”, and that 
the Committee, by its vote, had rejected this interpretation, 
showing that it recognized a distinction between the two. 
“Development,” it was said, meant adding to existing rules; 
“revision” meant modifying them. Moreover, “revision” 
should be mentioned in order to avoid the rigidity implied by 
the mention of “codification” of international law without 
provision for modification.  
 
In support of the use of the words “progressive 
development,” as in the second alternative draft; it was said 
that, juxtaposed as they were with codification, they implied 
modifications of as well as additions to existing rules. It was 
also argued that the first alternative draft, especially in its 
French version, virtually obligated the Assembly to proceed 
to revision of international law, an inappropriate task for a 
political body. “Progressive development” would establish 
a nice balance between stability and change, whereas 
“revision” would lay too much emphasis on change.57 
Article 13(1)(a) was later included in the text of the Charter, with the 
second alternative formulation, as proposed by the Subcommittee and 
approved by Committee II/2 on 7 June 1945. 
 
55 Id. 
56 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of Twenty-First Meeting of 
Committee II/2, 2, U.N. Doc. 848 II/2/46 (June 7, 1945), in Documents Vol. IX, supra note 28, at 178. 
57 Id. at 177–78 (emphasis added). 
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III. CONCLUSION: THE BALANCE BETWEEN STABILITY AND 
CHANGE 
Through a drawn out, and at times contentious, process the drafters of 
the Charter established a framework for the General Assembly’s future work 
in the development of international law that took into account the lessons of 
the past, while providing a basis for gradual change in the future. This rested 
on two assumptions. First, the focus of the Assembly’s new mandate would 
be on the development of general rules and principles of international law, 
and not the adjustment of any particular existing treaty regime. An unfettered 
power to impose the revision of established treaty arrangements was 
expressly rejected as being antithetical to stability. In its place, an 
understanding was reached by which the General Assembly retained a 
residual power, under the terms of Article 14, to recommend “the peaceful 
adjustment of any situation…likely to impair the general welfare or friendly 
relations among nations,” which could include a situation arising from a 
particular existing treaty arrangement. 
Second, in contemplating the further development of international law, 
the emphasis would be placed on stability, and in particular the stability of 
the treaty regime on which the new world order rising from the ashes of war 
would be based. At the same time, there was a recognition among the drafters 
that the mere codification of existing rules could prevent the evolution of the 
law necessary to take into account new realities and aspirations. The failure 
to do so could itself be a source of instability. The challenge facing the 
drafters was to find the right balance between stability and change––a 
Goldilocks point between consolidating the acquis of the law while looking 
to the future. But what kind of change was to be permitted, without upsetting 
the overall balance? What emerged was a carefully calibrated process of 
gradual change. The General Assembly was expressly not granted the 
authority to legislate. Furthermore, while the power to impose wholesale 
revision was also rejected, the end result nonetheless retained a strong quasi-
revisionary element (a type of “revision-light”). 
The key to the understanding the latter point lies in an appreciation of 
the meaning of change implied in the notion of “progressive development.” 
As the Chair of Committee II/2 noted, in explaining the vote in favour of the 
final formulation, change implied not only the incremental addition of new 
rules, as suggested by the word “development,” but also, from time to time, 
the modification of existing rules, which was envisaged by the addition of 
the adjective “progressive.” While sharing a similar meaning to “revision” 
(modification of existing rules) the composite concept of “progress 
development” was, to belabor the metaphor, neither too hot nor too cold, but 
just right, since in the view of the participating governments (no doubt, also 
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influenced by the general reception of the concept during the negotiations) 
the word “revision” would have skewed the overall balance towards change. 
